Industrial cybersecurity
OT security protects the industrial world, the world of plants, machines and control systems, where the rules are not those of IT: you cannot shut down production for a patch, decades-old equipment lives alongside the rest, and what is at stake is not just data, but keeping the plant running and making sure nobody gets hurt. We cover OT security end to end, anchored in IEC 62443: from seeing what you have to segmenting it, testing it and monitoring it, without bringing down what cannot be stopped.
Security built for OT, not recycled IT: from inventory to monitoring, across all of Spain.
Why OT is different
Applying office security recipes to the factory goes badly. The industrial world plays by other rules, and understanding them is half the work.
A production line is not shut down to install a patch. Availability rules, and that changes how you protect it.
Controllers, PLCs and industrial control systems (ICS) that have gone years without updates and were never designed with security in mind.
An attack on OT does not stay in the data: it can stop production, damage equipment or put people in danger.
IT tools do not work as-is. An aggressive scanner, normal on an office network, can bring down a controller.
The scope
We cover OT security in full, not a slice of it: the complete journey from the first inventory to real-time monitoring.
Discovering what is really on your industrial network (PLC, SCADA, sensors), which almost nobody has mapped. Without this, there is nothing to protect.
Your OT organized into zones and conduits, with security levels and maturity against the reference standard.
Separating the office world from the plant world so a problem in one does not jump to the other. The defense that holds back an attack the most.
Testing your OT the way an attacker would, with techniques designed not to bring down what cannot be stopped. It links to offensive security.
Continuous surveillance of industrial traffic with Sondriva, our SOC, to spot the odd before it becomes a problem.
Bringing OT into your master plan and making sure someone is accountable for it, not a no-man's-land.
The approach
In OT you do not start by buying a tool, but by seeing. First we build the inventory and understand your process, then we assess against IEC 62443, segment to contain, and only then do we test and monitor. Each step rests on the previous one, and none is done blindly.
And we do it with the care that OT demands. We work in agreed windows, on replicas when touching the live system is not safe, and with techniques that do not put production at risk. Security cannot cost more than the problem it prevents.
Why now
For years OT was isolated and that was enough. Not anymore: as it connects with IT and the cloud to pull data, that isolation disappears, and the attacks that stop factories have stopped being a rarity.
Encryption that starts in an office ends up stopping production, because IT and OT share more than anyone had looked at.
Integrators and manufacturers connecting in remotely to maintain equipment, often through paths nobody watches or closes.
The risk does not always come through your door: it arrives in an update, in a new piece of equipment or in a supplier's access.
A technician's laptop or a USB stick can bring into the plant exactly what the network would never have let through.
The standard
IEC 62443 is the reference family of standards for industrial cybersecurity. Its core idea is simple: divide your OT into zones according to how critical each part is and control the traffic between them with conduits. That is the basis of segmentation, what keeps a problem in one machine from becoming a problem across the whole plant.
It also defines security levels to decide how much protection each zone needs, without protecting too little or too much. And it covers two worlds: that of whoever operates a plant and that of whoever manufactures the equipment or the software, which is the angle that connects directly with the Cyber Resilience Act. We do not apply it as a recipe: it is a framework that we adapt to your reality.
When
If you produce, manufacture or manage critical infrastructure, you have OT, whether you have it mapped or not, and a blind spot to cover.
NIS2 reaches deep into industrial sectors such as energy, water or manufacturing, and looking at OT stops being optional.
The Cyber Resilience Act requires security in products with a digital component, and 62443 is the path to demonstrating it.
An incident, your own or in the sector, has made it clear that the plant gets attacked too and that it was not protected.
Method
We discover what is on your industrial network and how it talks to itself, without interfering with the process.
We define zones and conduits, measure the security levels and mark the gaps against the standard.
We separate IT from OT and protect what is critical, with planned changes so the operation is not interrupted.
We watch industrial traffic continuously and respond when something goes outside the norm.
Fits with
OT cybersecurity is the industrial arm of your security, not an island. What we assess here goes into your master plan and your risk analysis, what we test here is done by the same people as your pentest, and what we segment here is then watched over by Sondriva, our SOC.
And it is what closes the industrial side of compliance: IEC 62443 is the framework that answers what NIS2 asks of you in the critical sectors and what the Cyber Resilience Act asks of the product. The same work, used to protect and to comply.
Questions
It is the cybersecurity of the industrial world: plants, machines and control systems such as PLC, SCADA or ICS. It protects production so it keeps running and so nobody gets hurt, in an environment where availability and physical safety matter more than confidentiality.
It is the reference family of standards for industrial cybersecurity. It organizes your OT into zones and conduits, defines security levels for each zone and covers both whoever operates a plant and whoever manufactures the equipment or the software.
In its priorities and its limits. In IT, confidentiality rules and you can stop to update; in OT, availability rules, there is equipment that goes untouched for years and a poorly run test can bring down production. That is why OT security is not recycled IT security.
Very much so. NIS2 includes highly industrial sectors such as energy, water or manufacturing, and the Cyber Resilience Act requires security in products with a digital component. IEC 62443 is the framework that answers both.
Yes, carefully. The OT pentest is done with techniques and timing designed for environments that cannot be stopped, and when it is not safe to touch the live system, we work on replicas or in agreed windows.
Shall we protect your plant?
Tell us what your industrial environment is like and what worries you, and we will propose where to start securing your OT without stopping production.
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